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     IPsec Extensions to Support Robust Header Compression over IPsec
 
 Abstract
 
    Integrating Robust Header Compression (ROHC) with IPsec (ROHCoIPsec)
    offers the combined benefits of IP security services and efficient
    bandwidth utilization.  However, in order to integrate ROHC with
    IPsec, extensions to the Security Policy Database (SPD) and Security
    Association Database (SAD) are required.  This document describes the
    IPsec extensions required to support ROHCoIPsec.
 
 Status of This Memo
 
    This is an Internet Standards Track document.
 
    This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
    (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
    received public review and has been approved for publication by the
    Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
    Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
 
    Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
    and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
    http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5858.
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 1.  Introduction
 
    Using IPsec ([IPSEC]) protection offers various security services for
    IP traffic.  However, these benefits come at the cost of additional
    packet headers, which increase packet overhead.  By compressing the
    inner headers of these packets, the integration of Robust Header
    Compression (ROHC, [ROHC]) with IPsec (ROHCoIPsec, [ROHCOIPSEC]) can
    reduce the packet overhead associated with IPsec-protected flows.
 
    IPsec-protected traffic is carried over Security Associations (SAs),
    whose parameters are negotiated on a case-by-case basis.  The
    Security Policy Database (SPD) specifies the services that are to be
    offered to IP datagrams, and the parameters associated with SAs that
    have been established are stored in the Security Association Database
    (SAD).  For ROHCoIPsec, various extensions to the SPD and SAD that
    incorporate ROHC-relevant parameters are required.
 
    In addition, three extensions to IPsec processing are required.
    First, a mechanism for identifying ROHC packets must be defined.
    Second, a mechanism to ensure the integrity of the decompressed
    packet is needed.  Finally, the order of the inbound and outbound
    processing must be enumerated when nesting IP Compression (IPComp
    [IPCOMP]), ROHC, and IPsec processing.
 
 2.  Terminology
 
    The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
    "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
    document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [BRA97].
 
 3.  Extensions to IPsec Databases
 
    The following subsections specify extensions to the SPD and the SAD
    that MUST be supported for ROHCoIPsec.  The ROHCoIPsec fields in the
    SPD are used to populate the ROHCoIPsec parameters in the SAD during
    the initialization or rekey of a child SA.
 
    It is noted that these extensions do not have any implications on
    existing SPD fields or SAD parameters.  Therefore, a ROHCoIPsec
    implementation is backwards-compatible with an IPsec implementation
    that does not support header compression.
 
    Appendix A provides an example ASN.1 representation of an SPD that is
    extended to support ROHC.
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 3.1.  Security Policy Database (SPD)
 
    In general, the SPD is responsible for specifying the security
    services that are offered to IP datagrams.  Entries in the SPD
    specify how to derive the corresponding values for SAD entries.  To
    support ROHC, the SPD is extended to include per-channel ROHC
    parameters.  Together, the existing IPsec SPD parameters and the ROHC
    parameters will dictate the security and header compression services
    that are provided to packets.
 
    The fields contained within each SPD entry are defined in RFC 4301
    [IPSEC], Section 4.4.1.2.  To support ROHC, several processing info
    fields are added to the SPD; these fields contain information
    regarding the ROHC profiles and channel parameters supported by the
    local ROHC instance.
 
    If the processing action associated with the selector sets is
    PROTECT, then the processing info must be extended with the following
    ROHC channel parameters:
 
       MAX_CID: This field indicates the highest context ID that will be
       decompressed by the local decompressor.  MAX_CID MUST be at least
       0 and at most 16383 (the value 0 implies having one context).
 
       MRRU: The MRRU parameter indicates the size of the largest
       reconstructed unit (in octets) that the local decompressor is
       expected to reassemble from ROHC segments.  This size includes the
       Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) and the ROHC Integrity Check Value
       (ICV).  NOTE: Since in-order delivery of ROHC packets cannot be
       guaranteed, the MRRU parameter SHOULD be set to 0 (as stated in
       Section 5.2.5.1 of RFC 5795 [ROHC] and Section 6.1 of RFC 5225
       [ROHCV2]), which indicates that no segment headers are allowed on
       the ROHCoIPsec channel.
 
       PROFILES: This field is a list of ROHC profiles supported by the
       local decompressor.  Possible values for this list are contained
       in the "RObust Header Compression (ROHC) Profile Identifiers"
       registry [ROHCPROF].
 
    In addition to these ROHC channel parameters, a ROHC integrity
    algorithm and a ROHC ICV Length field MUST be included within the
    SPD:
 
       ROHC INTEGRITY ALGORITHM: This field is a list of integrity
       algorithms supported by the ROHCoIPsec instance.  This will be
       used by the ROHC process to ensure that packet headers are
       properly decompressed (see Section 4.2).  Authentication
       algorithms that MUST be supported are specified in the
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       "Authentication Algorithms" table in Section 3.1.1 ("ESP
       Encryption and Authentication Algorithms") of RFC 4835
       [CRYPTO-ALG] (or its successor).
 
       ROHC ICV LENGTH: This field specifies the length of the ICV that
       is used in conjunction with the ROHC integrity algorithm.
 
    Several other ROHC channel parameters are omitted from the SPD,
    because they are set implicitly.  The omitted channel parameters are
    LARGE_CIDS and FEEDBACK_FOR.  The LARGE_CIDS channel parameter MUST
    be set based on the value of MAX_CID (i.e., if MAX_CID is <= 15,
    LARGE_CIDS is assumed to be 0).  Finally, the ROHC FEEDBACK_FOR
    channel parameter MUST be set to the ROHC channel associated with the
    SA in the reverse direction.  If an SA in the reverse direction does
    not exist, the FEEDBACK_FOR channel parameter is not set, and ROHC
    MUST NOT operate in bi-directional Mode.
 
 3.2.  Security Association Database (SAD)
 
    Each entry within the SAD defines the parameters associated with each
    established SA.  Unless the "populate from packet" (PFP) flag is
    asserted for a particular field, SAD entries are determined by the
    corresponding SPD entries during the creation of the SA.
 
    The data items contained within the SAD are defined in RFC 4301
    [IPSEC], Section 4.4.2.1.  To support ROHC, the SAD must include a
    "ROHC Data Item"; this data item contains parameters used by ROHC
    instance.  The ROHC Data Item exists for both inbound and outbound
    SAs.
 
    The ROHC Data Item includes the ROHC channel parameters for the SA.
    These channel parameters (i.e., MAX_CID, PROFILES, MRRU) are
    enumerated above in Section 3.1.  For inbound SAs, the ROHC Data Item
    MUST specify the ROHC channel parameters that are used by the local
    decompressor instance; conversely, for outbound SAs, the ROHC Data
    Item MUST specify the ROHC channel parameters that are used by local
    compressor instance.
 
    In addition to these ROHC channel parameters, the ROHC Data Item for
    both inbound and outbound SAs MUST include three additional
    parameters.  Specifically, these parameters store the integrity
    algorithm, the algorithm’s respective key, and the ICV length that is
    used by the ROHC process (see Section 3.2).  The integrity algorithm
    and its associated key are used to calculate a ROHC ICV of the
    specified length; this ICV is used to verify the packet headers post-
    decompression.
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    Finally, for inbound SAs, the ROHC Data Item MUST include a
    FEEDBACK_FOR parameter.  The parameter is a reference to a ROHC
    channel in the opposite direction (i.e., the outbound SA) between the
    same compression endpoints.  A ROHC channel associated with an
    inbound SA and a ROHC channel associated with an outbound SA MAY be
    coupled to form a bi-directional ROHC channel as defined in Sections
    6.1 and 6.2 in RFC 3759 [ROHC-TERM].
 
    "ROHC Data Item" values MAY be initialized manually (i.e.,
    administratively configured for manual SAs), or initialized via a key
    exchange protocol (e.g., IKEv2 [IKEV2]) that has been extended to
    support the signaling of ROHC parameters [IKE-ROHC].
 
 4.  Extensions to IPsec Processing
 
 4.1.  Identification of Header-Compressed Traffic
 
    A "ROHC" protocol identifier is used to identify header-compressed
    traffic on a ROHC-enabled SA.  If an outbound packet has a compressed
    header, the Next Header field of the security protocol header (e.g.,
    Authentication Header (AH) [AH], Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
    [ESP]) MUST be set to the "ROHC" protocol identifier.  If the packet
    header has not been compressed by ROHC, the Next Header field does
    not contain the "ROHC" protocol identifier.  Conversely, for an
    inbound packet, the value of the security protocol Next Header field
    MUST be checked to determine if the packet includes a ROHC header, in
    order to determine if it requires ROHC decompression.
 
    Use of the "ROHC" protocol identifier for purposes other than
    ROHCoIPsec is currently not defined.  Future protocols that make use
    of the allocation (e.g., other applications of ROHC in multi-hop
    environments) require specification of the logical compression
    channel between the ROHC compressor and decompressor.  In addition,
    these specifications will require the investigation of the security
    considerations associated with use of the "ROHC" protocol identifier
    outside the context of the Next Header field of security protocol
    headers.
 
 4.2.  Verifying the Integrity of Decompressed Packet Headers
 
    As documented in Section 6.1.4 of [ROHCOIPSEC], ROHC is inherently a
    lossy compression algorithm: the consequences of significant packet
    reordering or loss between ROHC peers may include undetected
    decompression failures, where erroneous packets are forwarded into
    the protected domain.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ertekin, et al.              Standards Track                    [Page 6] 
 RFC 5858         IPsec Extensions to Support ROHCoIPsec         may 2010
 
 
    To ensure that a decompressed header is identical to the original
    header, ROHCoIPsec MAY use an additional integrity algorithm (and
    respective key) to compute a second Integrity Check Value (ICV).
    This ROHC ICV MUST be computed over the uncompressed IP header, as
    well at the higher-layer headers and the packet payload.  When
    computed, the ICV is appended to the ROHC-compressed packet.  At the
    decompressor, the decompressed packet (including the uncompressed IP
    header, higher-layer headers, and packet payload; but not including
    the authentication data) will be used with the integrity algorithm
    (and its respective key) to compute a value that will be compared to
    the appended ICV.  If these values are not identical, the
    decompressed packet MUST be dropped.
 
    Figure 1 illustrates the composition of a ROHCoIPsec-processed IPv4
    packet.  In the example, TCP/IP compression is applied, and the
    packet is processed with tunnel mode ESP.
 
                 BEFORE COMPRESSION AND APPLICATION OF ESP
                 ----------------------------
           IPv4  |orig IP hdr  |     |      |
                 |(any options)| TCP | Data |
                 ----------------------------
 
                  AFTER ROHCOIPSEC COMPRESSION AND APPLICATION OF ESP
                ------------------------------------------------------
          IPv4  | new IP hdr  |     | Cmpr. |    | ROHC | ESP   | ESP|
                |(any options)| ESP | Hdr.  |Data| ICV  |Trailer| ICV|
                ------------------------------------------------------
 
    Figure 1.  Example of a ROHCoIPsec-Processed Packet
 
    Note: At the decompressor, the ROHC ICV field is not included in the
    calculation of the ROHC ICV.
 
 4.2.1.  ICV Computation and Integrity Verification
 
    In order to correctly verify the integrity of the decompressed
    packets, the processing steps for ROHCoIPsec MUST be implemented in a
    specific order, as given below.
 
    For outbound packets that are processed by ROHC and are IPsec-
    protected:
 
    o  Compute an ICV for the uncompressed packet with the negotiated
       (ROHC) integrity algorithm and its respective key.
 
    o  Compress the packet headers (as specified by the ROHC process).
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    o  Append the ICV to the compressed packet.
 
    o  Apply AH or ESP processing to the packet, as specified in the
       appropriate SAD entry.
 
    For inbound packets that are to be decompressed by ROHC:
 
    o  Apply AH or ESP processing, as specified in the appropriate SAD
       entry.
 
    o  Remove the ICV from the packet.
 
    o  Decompress the packet header(s).
 
    o  Compute an ICV for the decompressed packet with the negotiated
       (ROHC) integrity algorithm and its respective key.
 
    o  Compare the computed ICV to the original ICV calculated at the
       compressor: if these two values differ, the packet MUST be
       dropped; otherwise, resume IPsec processing.
 
 4.3.  ROHC Segmentation and IPsec Tunnel MTU
 
    In certain scenarios, a ROHCoIPsec-processed packet may exceed the
    size of the IPsec tunnel MTU.  RFC 4301 [IPSEC] currently stipulates
    the following for outbound traffic that exceeds the SA Path MTU
    (PMTU):
 
        Case 1: Original (cleartext) packet is IPv4 and has the Don’t
                Fragment (DF) bit set.  The implementation should
                discard the packet and send a PMTU ICMP message.
 
        Case 2: Original (cleartext) packet is IPv4 and has the DF
                bit clear.  The implementation should fragment (before or
                after encryption per its configuration) and then forward
                the fragments.  It should not send a PMTU ICMP message.
 
        Case 3: Original (cleartext) packet is IPv6.  The implementation
                should discard the packet and send a PMTU ICMP message.
 
    For the ROHCoIPsec processing model, there is one minor change to the
    procedure stated above.  This change applies to pre-encryption
    fragmentation for Case 2.  Since current ROHC compression profiles do
    not support compression of IP packet fragments, pre-encryption
    fragmentation MUST NOT occur before ROHC processing.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ertekin, et al.              Standards Track                    [Page 8] 
 RFC 5858         IPsec Extensions to Support ROHCoIPsec         may 2010
 
 
    If the compressed packet exceeds the SA PMTU, and the MRRU is non-
    zero, ROHC segmentation MAY be used to divide the packet, where each
    segment conforms to the tunnel MTU.  ROHC segmentation MUST occur
    before AH or ESP processing.  Because in-order delivery of ROHC
    segments is not guaranteed, the use of ROHC segmentation is not
    recommended.
 
    If segmentation is applied, the process MUST account for the
    additional overhead imposed by the IPsec process (e.g., AH or ESP
    overhead, crypto synchronization data, the additional IP header,
    etc.) such that the final IPsec-processed segments are less than the
    tunnel MTU.  After segmentation, each ROHC segment is consecutively
    processed by the appropriate security protocol (e.g., AH, ESP)
    instantiated on the ROHC-enabled SA.  Since ROHC segments are
    processed consecutively, the associated AH/ESP sequence number MUST
    be incremented by one for each segment transmitted over the ROHC
    channel.  As such, after all ROHC segments receive AH/ESP processing,
    these segments can be identified (at the remote IPsec implementation)
    by a range of contiguous AH/ESP sequence numbers.
 
    For channels where the MRRU is non-zero, the ROHCoIPsec decompressor
    MUST re-assemble the ROHC segments that are received.  To accomplish
    this, the decompressor MUST identify the ROHC segments (as documented
    in Section 5.2 of RFC 5795 [ROHC]), and attempt reconstruction using
    the ROHC segmentation protocol (Section 5.2.5 of RFC 5795 [ROHC]).
    To assist the reconstruction process, the AH/ESP sequence number
    SHOULD be used to identify segments that may have been subject to
    reordering.  If reconstruction fails, the packet MUST be discarded.
 
    As stated in Section 3.2.1, if the ROHC integrity algorithm is used
    to verify the decompression of packet headers, this ICV is appended
    to the compressed packet.  If ROHC segmentation is performed, the
    segmentation algorithm is executed on the compressed packet and the
    appended ICV.  Note that the ICV is not appended to each ROHC
    segment.
 
    Under certain circumstances, IPsec implementations will not process
    (or receive) unprotected ICMP messages, or they will not have a Path
    MTU estimated value.  In these cases, the IPsec implementation SHOULD
    NOT attempt to segment the ROHC-compressed packet, as it does not
    have full insight into the path MTU in the unprotected domain.
 
 4.4.  Nested IPComp and ROHCoIPsec Processing
 
    IPComp ([IPCOMP]) is another mechanism that can be implemented to
    reduce the size of an IP datagram.  If IPComp and ROHCoIPsec are
    implemented in a nested fashion, the following steps MUST be followed
    for outbound and inbound packets.
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    For outbound packets that are to be processed by IPComp and ROHC:
 
    o  The ICV is computed for the uncompressed packet, and the
       appropriate ROHC compression profile is applied to the packet.
 
    o  IPComp is applied, and the packet is sent to the IPsec process.
 
    o  The security protocol is applied to the packet.
 
    Conversely, for inbound packets that are to be both ROHC- and IPComp-
    decompressed:
 
    o  A packet received on a ROHC-enabled SA is IPsec-processed.
 
    o  The datagram is decompressed based on the appropriate IPComp
       algorithm.
 
    o  The packet is sent to the ROHC module for header decompression and
       integrity verification.
 
 5.  Security Considerations
 
    A ROHCoIPsec implementer should consider the strength of protection
    provided by the integrity check algorithm used to verify decompressed
    headers.  Failure to implement a strong integrity check algorithm
    increases the probability for an invalidly decompressed packet to be
    forwarded by a ROHCoIPsec device into a protected domain.
 
    The implementation of ROHCoIPsec may increase the susceptibility for
    traffic flow analysis, where an attacker can identify new traffic
    flows by monitoring the relative size of the encrypted packets (i.e.,
    a group of "long" packets, followed by a long series of "short"
    packets may indicate a new flow for some ROHCoIPsec implementations).
    To mitigate this concern, ROHC padding mechanisms may be used to
    arbitrarily add padding to transmitted packets to randomize packet
    sizes.  This technique, however, reduces the overall efficiency
    benefit offered by header compression.
 
 6.  IANA Considerations
 
    IANA has allocated the value 142 to "ROHC" within the "Protocol
    Numbers" registry [PROTOCOL].  This value will be used to indicate
    that the next-level protocol header is a ROHC header.
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 Appendix A.  ASN.1 Representation for ROHCoIPsec
 
    This appendix is included as an additional way to describe the
    ROHCoIPsec parameters that are included in the IPsec SPD.  It uses
    portions of the ASN.1 syntax provided in Appendix C of RFC 4301
    [IPSEC].  In addition, several new structures are defined.
 
    This syntax has been successfully compiled.  However, it is merely
    illustrative and need not be employed in an implementation to achieve
    compliance.
 
    The "Processing" data structure, defined in Appendix C of RFC 4301,
    is augmented to include a ROHC parameters element as follows:
 
          Processing ::= SEQUENCE {
              extSeqNum   BOOLEAN, -- TRUE 64 bit counter, FALSE 32 bit
              seqOverflow BOOLEAN, -- TRUE rekey, FALSE terminate & audit
              fragCheck   BOOLEAN, -- TRUE stateful fragment checking,
                                   -- FALSE no stateful fragment checking
              lifetime    SALifetime,
              spi         ManualSPI,
              algorithms  ProcessingAlgs,
              tunnel      TunnelOptions OPTIONAL,
              rohc        [7] RohcParams OPTIONAL
 
          }
 
    The following data structures describe these ROHC parameters:
 
        RohcParams ::= SEQUENCE {
            rohcEnabled         BOOLEAN, --  TRUE, hdr compr. is enabled
                                         -- FALSE, hdr compr. is disabled
            maxCID              INTEGER (0..16383),
            mrru                INTEGER,
            profiles            RohcProfiles,
            rohcIntegAlg        RohcIntegAlgs,
            rohcIntegICVLength  INTEGER
            }
 
        RohcProfiles ::= SET OF RohcProfile
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        RohcProfile ::= INTEGER {
            rohcv1-rtp           (1),
            rohcv1-udp           (2),
            rohcv1-esp           (3),
            rohcv1-ip            (4),
 
            rohcv1-tcp           (6),
            rohcv1-rtp-udpLite   (7),
            rohcv1-udpLite       (8),
 
            rohcv2-rtp         (257),
            rohcv2-udp         (258),
            rohcv2-esp         (259),
            rohcv2-ip          (260),
 
            rohcv2-rtp-udpLite (263),
            rohcv2-udpLite     (264)
 
            -- values taken from [ROHCPROF]
 
            }
 
        RohcIntegAlgs ::= SEQUENCE {
            algorithm   RohcIntegAlgType,
            parameters  ANY -- DEFINED BY algorithm -- OPTIONAL }
 
        RohcIntegAlgType ::= INTEGER {
            none                    (0),
            auth-HMAC-MD5-96        (1),
            auth-HMAC-SHA1-96       (2),
            auth-DES-MAC            (3),
            auth-KPDK-MD5           (4),
            auth-AES-XCBC-96        (5),
            auth-HMAC-MD5-128       (6),
            auth-HMAC-SHA1-160      (7),
            auth-AES-CMAC-96        (8),
            auth-AES-128-GMAC       (9),
            auth-AES-192-GMAC      (10),
            auth-AES-256-GMAC      (11),
            auth-HMAC-SHA2-256-128 (12),
            auth-HMAC-SHA2-384-192 (13),
            auth-HMAC-SHA2-512-256 (14)
            --  tbd (15..65535)
 
            -- values taken from "Transform Type 3 - Integrity
            -- Algorithm Transform IDs" at [IKEV2-PARA]
 
            }
 
 
 
 Ertekin, et al.              Standards Track                   [Page 13] 
 RFC 5858         IPsec Extensions to Support ROHCoIPsec         may 2010
 
 
 8.  References
 
 8.1.  Normative References
 
    [IPSEC]       Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
                  Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
 
    [ROHC]        Sandlund, K., Pelletier, G., and L-E. Jonsson, "The
                  RObust Header Compression (ROHC) Framework", RFC 5795,
                  March 2010.
 
    [IPCOMP]      Shacham, A., Monsour, B., Pereira, R., and M. Thomas,
                  "IP Payload Compression Protocol (IPComp)", RFC 3173,
                  September 2001.
 
    [BRA97]       Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
                  Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
 
    [ROHCV2]      Pelletier, G. and K. Sandlund, "RObust Header
                  Compression Version 2 (ROHCv2): Profiles for RTP, UDP,
                  IP, ESP and UDP-Lite", RFC 5225, April 2008.
 
    [IKEV2]       Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
                  RFC 4306, December 2005.
 
    [IKE-ROHC]    Ertekin, E., Christou, C., Jasani, R., Kivinen, T., and
                  C. Bormann, "IKEv2 Extensions to Support Robust Header
                  Compression over IPsec", RFC 5857, May 2010.
 
    [AH]          Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
                  December 2005.
 
    [ESP]         Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
                  RFC 4303, December 2005.
 
 8.2.  Informative References
 
    [ROHCOIPSEC]  Ertekin, E., Jasani, R., Christou, C., and C. Bormann,
                  "Integration of Header Compression over IPsec Security
                  Associations", RFC 5856, May 2010.
 
    [ROHCPROF]    IANA, "RObust Header Compression (ROHC) Profile
                  Identifiers", <http://www.iana.org>.
 
    [CRYPTO-ALG]  Manral, V., "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation
                  Requirements for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
                  and Authentication Header (AH)", RFC 4835, April 2007.
 
 
 
 
 Ertekin, et al.              Standards Track                   [Page 14] 
 RFC 5858         IPsec Extensions to Support ROHCoIPsec         may 2010
 
 
    [ROHC-TERM]   Jonsson, L-E., "Robust Header Compression (ROHC):
                  Terminology and Channel Mapping Examples", RFC 3759,
                  April 2004.
 
    [PROTOCOL]    IANA, "Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers",
                  <http://www.iana.org>.
 
    [IKEV2-PARA]  IANA, "Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)
                  Parameters", <http://www.iana.org>.
 
 Authors’ Addresses
 
    Emre Ertekin
    Booz Allen Hamilton
    5220 Pacific Concourse Drive, Suite 200
    Los Angeles, CA  90045
    US
 
    EMail: ertekin_emre@bah.com
 
 
    Chris Christou
    Booz Allen Hamilton
    13200 Woodland Park Dr.
    Herndon, VA  20171
    US
 
    EMail: christou_chris@bah.com
 
 
    Carsten Bormann
    Universitaet Bremen TZI
    Postfach 330440
    Bremen  D-28334
    Germany
 
    EMail: cabo@tzi.org
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ertekin, et al.              Standards Track                   [Page 15] 